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The correspondence between the demand for capital and various measures
of the return on assets, the cost of capital, and Tobin’s q often is tenuous
(Abel and Blanchard 1986; Hayashi 1982), at times even perverse. Of a variety
of possible explanations, this paper considers the consequences of allowing
for declining returns to capital--a declining marginal efficiency of capital
schedule (MEC). This modification not only relaxes the connection between the
demand for capital and many of its traditional determinants, but it also may
introduce a connection among the value of the firm, its financial structure,
and its stock of assets.
When a shift of the MEC increases q on marginal assets, the demand for
capital may increase greatly, negligibly, or, perhaps, even fall. The outcome
depends partly on the shape of the MEC even if marginal q always equals unity
for the optimal stock of assets. The demand for capital increases less, other
things equal, as the MEC becomes more concave--as prospective returns on
inf~amarginal assets increase more than those on marginal assets. The answer
also depends on the determinants of q. Under plausible circumstances, the
value of an enterprise may depend on its capital structure as well as its
*Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The
analysis presented in this paper does not necessarily represent the view~of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or that of the Federal Reserve System.
October 11, 1991.stock of assets. Accordingly, the demand for capital may fall even though q
on marginal assets rises, because optimal leverage may change sufficiently.~
The first section of this paper introduces a simple, one-period
investment project with declining returns to scale. When changes in business
conditions do not change the project’s marginal returns identically at
stocks of capital, the more concave the MEC becomes, the smaller is the
subsequent change in the demand for capital, other things equal. Should the
cost of .capital increase with the stock of assets (the systematic risk rises
as rents become less consequential), a shift of the MEC that increases the
marginal return on assets might depress the demand for capital if average
returns increase more than marginal returns.
In the second section, the value of the project varies with leverage
because shareholders’ expectations of economic rents exceed those of creditors
and because the tax burden on shareholders’ returns exceeds that on returns
distributed to creditors. Inasmuch as q is a function of ~wo variables,
assets and leverage, a shift of the MEC that reduces marginal q (the partial
derivative of q with respect to assets) at the formerly optimal stock of
assets does not necessarily reduce the opti~al stock of assets. Other things
equal, the demand for capital may rise as leverage falls, when the MEC becomes
less concave. This consequence is illustrated in a numerical example
presented in the third section of this paper.
The concluding section suggests that this analysis is consistent with
the relatively robust performance_of accelerator or cash flow models of
ISimilarly, for a function of several variables, a positive partial
derivative with respect to the first variable does not imply that this
variable must increase if the function is to attain its maximum through the
adjustment of all its variables.investment. It also suggests a reconciliation of the pecking order view of
financing investment with the existence of an optimal financial structure.
This analysis also is consistent with a cyclical variation of leverage and an
existence of a type of "credit crunch" not fully reflected in rates of
interest. The difference between the hurdle rate of return requir~~ of
~~investments and the rate of interest depends on the perceived slope of the
MEC, especially the perceptions of creditors. Although this analysis dwells
on the choice of capital structure in conjunction with the demand for capital,
similar conclusions also may arise whenever the value of the firm depends on
the choice of other variables--the mix of factors of production, the choice of
technology, the pricing of output, or the composition of output.
I - Homogeneous Expectations: The Cost of Capital Is Independent of Leverage
The demand for investment goods may not correspond closely to changes in
marginal q if marginal returns do not change commensurately at all stocks of
assets when the MEC shifts. In th-is case, changes in the optimal stock of
assets depend on changes in the slope of the MEC as well as changes in
marginal q. Accordingly, when marginal q rises at the formerly optimal stock
of assets, the demand for capital also rises, but this demand may increase
much or little, depending on the shape of the MEC.
Unlike changes in marginal q, changes in marginal returns or the
marginal cost of capital might not consistently indicate whether the demand
for capital rises or falls if the enterprise’s returns are correlated with
those of the market portfolio. If this correlation (a measure of systematic
risk) should vary with the project’s stock of assets,2 then the rate of
2This implies that the effective cost of capital varies with the demand
for capital. In a dynamic setting, the models of Witte (1963) and Hayashi
(1982) observe that the effective cost of capital also may vary with the
demand for investment goods as a result of adjustment costs.return required of marginal assets would depend on the slope of the MEC.
Assuming the project’s systematic risk rises with its stock of assets, then
the demand for capital may fall as the MEC shifts upward, provided the slope
of the MEC becomes sufficiently steep, thereby raising the rate of return
required of marginal assets.
The Return on Assets~ the Cost of Capital and Tobin’s q
The total returns accruing to a one-year investment project, tr, depend
on its stock of assets, A. Initially, expected returns, TR, may increase as A
increases. But once A exceeds some critical value, A*, TR falls as A
increases, due to the exhaustion of specialized resources, diseconomies of
scale, the increasing cost of obtaining labor services and materials, or the
increasing cost of attracting customers. Accordingly, expected returns equal
(i) TR(A), where TR# is negative when A exceeds A~,
Because TR" is negative, the expected rate of return on marginal assets,
AT~/AA - T~z, falls as A increases above A*.
In the spirit of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the cost of capital, p,
is the shareholders’ rate of discount when the project is financed entirely
with equity (Modigliani and Miller 1958 andS1963; Miller and Modigliani 1961;
Miller 1977; Myers 1984). However the project is financed, its securities are
priced so that they are held in the optimal market portfolio (Lintner 1965).
Whatever the blend of these securities, their composite expected return is
identically TR(A).3 Therefore, the value of the project’s securities i~s the
market valuation of its prospective total return. Whether this return is
3When the income that accrues to shareholders is taxed differently than
the income accruing to creditors, this assertion is not true. See note 4 and
section II.
4conveyed entirely by equity or by another blend of securities, it warrants
only one cost of capital and one valuation in the market portfolio.
Because the market value of the enterprise is independent of its
financing, Tobin’s q equals the replacement value of assets, A, divided into
~-~the value of equity (the present value of shareholders’ expected receipts)
when the project is financed entirely with equity, V.4 Denoting the discount
rate by p and the expected rate of return on assets (TR/A) by R,
(2) V = A(!+R)/(I+@), and
(3) q = (I+R)/(I+@).
Marqinal q, Marqinal Returns, and the Optimal Stock of Assets
For any stock of assets, marginal q is the change in the overall market
value of the enterprise resulting from adding another asset, A(qA), divided
by the replacement value of this asset, AA. Denoting marginal q by u and
the derivative of qA with respect to A by DA(qA),
(4) u = DA(qA) = q + A DAq.
Because the value of the enterprise does not depend on leverage, A(qA) equals
AV when the enterprise is financed entirely with equity:
(s) u =DAY= q÷ (TRz- R-
Provided p does not fall as A increases, a declining MEC entails that q
exceeds marginal q.
Proposition I: If q is independent of leverage and shareholders maximize
their aggregate wealth, then:
4Personal and corporate income tax rates are not considered in this
section. An explicit consideration of a simple corporate income tax is
deferred until section II. .For a review and analysis of much of the
literature covering taxes, corporate finance, and investment incentives see
Auerbach (1983) and Poterba and Summers (1983).(a) the optimal stock of assets equates marginal q with
unity, but neither the marginal return on assets nor
the marginal cost of cap.ital equals the discount rate
unless the discount rate does not vary with the
project’s stock of assets;
(b) a shift of the MEC that increases (decreases) marginal
q also increases (decreases) A, but the degree to
which A changes depends on the shape of the MEC;
(c)- when the cost of capital depends on A, a shift of the
MEC that increases (decreases) the marginal return on
assets may decrease (increase) A.
Because q does not depend on leverage, the optimal choice of A also does
not depend on leverage. Suppose the prQject is financed entirely with equity.
Should shareholders change their investment in the project, the change in
their wealth would equal the change in the value of the enterprise, AV, less
the change in the replacement value of assets, ~A. At the optimal stock of
assets, z%V equals AA,5 implying that
(6) I = D.
Substituting (5) into (6) and (3) for q in the first term of (5),
(7) p = TR~ - qAD~p.
At the optimal stock of assets, the expected rate of return on the
marginal asset equals the cost of capital only if the cost of capital does not
vary with assets.6 From (7), the marginal cost of capital may be defined as
The Demand for Capital: The Cost of Capital Is Constant
.~    In Figure I, .the optimal scale of the project (Ao) is defined initially
by the intersection of TRI with the horizontal cost of capital function°
5This arbitrage between capital goods and equities is essentially tha~
described by Keynes (1936, chapter 12) and Tobin (1969, 1982).
6TR/ equals p also because the personal and corporate income tax rates
are zero (King 1977; Auerbach 1979).Because alternatives I and II increase TR/ by the same amount at Ao, they
also increase u = ((Z+TRI)/(I+p)) by the same amount at Ao- For I (~Rz
becomes more concave) the optimal stock of assets is less than that for II
(TRI becomes more convex), q is greatest for alternative I, which offers the










I1: TR’ = 1.594- 0.88"A
R =1.594-0.8-A
Although an increase in expected marginal returns or marginal q
correctly foretells a greater demand for capital, these statistics are not
sufficient for determining the magnitude of this demand without knowledge of
the shape of the MEC schedule.
The Demand for Capital: The Cost of Capital Increases with Assets
When the MEC is declining, the uncertainty regarding the rate of return
on marginal investments may increase as the expected return on marginal
investments falls. Furthermore, the covariance between the return on assetsand the return on the market portfolio may increase as the project’s unique
features dwindle along with the rent. When the downward-sloping MEC is
accompanied by a rising covariance between the project’s returns and market
returns, p increases with A for risk-averse investors. In this case, the~
distinction between the MEC and the cost of capital becomes much less








TR’ = a-bA c
R =a-bA°i(C+ 1)
= .05 + .0005 A
I:a= .255, b = 10 ~9c= 4
I1: a = 10.0, b = 6;205, c = .1
l,
q = (! + R) / (~ + p)
The demand for capital depends on the slopes of the functions TR/ and
p. According to (7), demand tends to fall as DAp increases or as average
returns (q). increase relative to marginal returns (marginal q).
Suppose the demand for the project’s output shifts, increasing both the
rents on inframarginal assets and the return on marginal assets~(Figure 2)
Initially, TR/ intersects the marginal cost of capital schedule at point I.
If the rents on inframarginal assets rise more than the return on marginalassets, .then the marginal cost of capital schedule may shift upward more-than
TR/ at point I. The optimal stock of assets falls even though (~Rz-p)
increases, because the increase in q is sufficiently great compared to the
increase in T~/ at point I -- T~!I~ is more concave than ~z~.
II. Heterogeneous Expectations: The Cost of Capital Increases with Leverage
When the value of an enterprise depends on its capital structure, the
stock of assets that equates marginal q with unity also may vary with its
choice of leverage. Because the enterprise’s optimal capital structure
depends on the slope of its MEC under these circumstances, its optimal stock
of assets also may depend on the slope of its MEC.
In this section q depends on leverage as a result of asymmetries in the
income tax laws and differences among investors’ expectations.7 Accord~ngly,
w.hen a shift of the MEC decreases marginal q, the demand for capital may rise
if the MEC becomes less concave. In other words, when the value of an
enterprise is a function of more than one variable (here, assets and
leverage), a change in conditions that reduces the partial derivative of this
value with respect to assets (evaluated at the formerly optimal stock of
assets and leverage) does not necessarily imply that the optimal stock of
assets falls if the optimal choice of leverage also changes.
7These examples are not the only sources of heterogeneity or asymmetry.
Suppose income is not taxed, as was the case before 1909. If shareholders
lacked sufficient resources to finance the project themselves (to purchase a
stock of assets even as great as A*), they might pay a premium to obtain
external financing. Regulations, contracts, and conventions governing the
eligible assets of banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other
institutional investors tend to favor debt over equity, thereby increasing the
cost of external equity financing compared to that of debt financing. Even if
outsiders were no less optimistic than shareholders, external financing may
command a premium,, because those who control access to external financing may
attempt to extract a participation in the p~oject’s rents. See Navin and
Sears (1955), Carosso (1970), Baski~ (1988), and Bernanke and Gertler (1990).Leveraqe, Homoqeneous Expectations~ and q
The proportion of the project’s assets financed by equity is ~; that
financed by debt is (I-~). Denoting the rate of interest on debt by i, the
rate of return to creditors is i as long as the rate of return on assets
(tr/A = r) plus shareholders’ equity is great enough to pay debt service
obligations; otherwise, the rate of return to creditors is only
(~+~)/(z-~). This rate of return on debt is rc, and its expected value is
Re. Given ~, i equates the expected return on debt with the creditor’s
discount rate, pc.8 Denoting the probability density function for the return
on assets by pdf(r),
(8)
~                  (~-@) i-~
: i l pdf(r) dr+ [ {(r+9)/(i-9) } pdf(r) dr, or





The "risk premium" embedded in i equals the expected value of the potential
losses on debt contracts. Other things equal, a lower R entails a greater i.
Both the interest rate and the discount rate on debt may vary with the
enterprise’s leverage. If the return on assets is not correlated with that on
the market portfolio or if creditors are risk-neutral, po equals the
risk-free rate of return for all ~. When r is positively correlated with
market returns and creditors are risk-averse, ~o rises as ~ falls, because
8The descriptions of creditors’ and shareholders’ discount rates and
their relationship to the cost of capital are discussed in more detail below.
i0the covariance between rc and market returns increases with leverage.9 When
~ is near unity, neither i nor Pc exceeds the risk-free rate of return
significantly. As ~ approaches zero, (i-pc) increases as the distribution
of rc becomes more diffuse and~the coverage ratio, R/(i(l-~)), falls.
The returns on assets and debt are related to the return on equity, re,
and its expected value, Re, according to the following accounting identities:
(I0) r = ~r~ + (l-9)rc, and
(i~) R = 9R~ + (i-~)Rc,
Denoting the shareholders’ discount rate as
(12)
q : ~ (l+Re) / (l+@e) + (i-~0) (I+Rc) / (l+Pc)
{I+ I (r- (i-9)i)/9 pdf(r) dr
(i-~) i-~
(i-$) {i + ( f (i-~) i pdf(r) dr +
(I-~) i-~
(I-~) i-~




Proposition 2: If q is independent of capital structure, then (12) equals
(3); and if i equates Rc with p=, then:
(13) 9Pe + (l-9)pc = R - (R-p) (l+p)-i(l+pe).
(a) When the MEC is declining and R exceeds p (q
exceeds unity), the weighted discount rate is less
than the expected rate of return on assets. Unless
Pe is less than or equal to p, (13) implies that the
~The distribution of rc~collapses on i as ~ approaches unity, whereas
the distribution of rc approaches that of ~ as ~ approaches zero.
11weighted discount rate also is less than the cost of
capital.I°
(b) If the return on assets is correlated positively
with market returns and investors are risk-averse,
then the covariance between market returns and z~
increases with leverage, p~ increases with leverage,
and (13) implies that the difference between R and the
weighted discount rate also increases with leverage
when assets are fixed.
(c) If the return on assets is not correlated with
market returns or investors are risk-neutral, then the
cost of capital and the discount rates of shareholders
and creditors equal the risk-free rate of return.
Leveraqe, Heteroqeneous Expectations, and q
Other things equal, q falls with increasing leverage when shareholders’
expectation of economic rents exceeds that of creditors. Shareholders may be
more optimistic about their project’s returns for at least two reasons.
First, the uncertainty inherent in a project’s returns may be reflected in the
distribution of assessments among investors even when the same information is
available to all. Second, not all investors possess the same information or
are equally able to extract rents from a specific project. In either case,
equity is most valuable to those who foresee the opportunity for the most
profit; others are less eager to acquire a residual claim on the enterprise’s
returns (Navin and Sears 1955; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf
1984; Baskin 1988; Bernanke and Gertler1990).11
10p~ cannot be less than p unless r is negatively correlated with the
rate of return on the market portfolio. See cases (b) and (c) below.
1~Inve~tors’ expectations of returns may span the range extending from
the very optimistic to the very pessimistic. In the eyes of creditors,
shareholders are most likely to experience "winners’ curses." The marginal
creditor ordinarily is less optimistic than the inframarginal creditor.
Similarly, marginal shareholders tend to be less optimistic than inframarg~nal
shareholders. In this continuous spectrum of opinions, some "outsiders"
(creditors) are more optimistic than others. Only after leverage is so great
and the marginal creditors are sufficiently pessimistic, does the firm offer
equity or mezzanine stakes to the more optimistic outsiders.
12Suppose, for Simplicity, that a project’s return on assets is not
correlated with market returns or that investors are risk-neutral, implying
that Pe and Pc equal p for all A and for all m- Denoting the creditors’
~assessment of the distribution of the rate of return on assets as Pdfc(r) and
the shareholders’ assessment as pdf(r), (12) becomes,
(14
(I-9) i-9




= (I+R) / (i+p) + {
(I-~) i-~
(l-m)i Pdfc(r) dr + f (r+m) pdfc(r) dr } / (l+p)
-100%




= (i+~) / (!+p) +
(r+m) (Pdfc(r)-pdf(r) ) dr } / (l+p)
{ p (i-m) -
::                             (I-~) i-%~
~ (1-m) i pdf(r) dr - ~
(I-%~) i~ -i00%
(r+m) pdf(r) dr } / (l+p) .
If Pdfc(r) were identical to pdf(r), q would be independent of m. The last
equality in (14) obtains because the rate of interest equates the expected
return on debt with the creditors’ discount rate (see (9)).12
121n this model, the terms on debt compensate creditors for the risks
they bear (the interest rate floats), the market value of debt equals its face
value, and shareholders hav~ no opportunity to benefit from strategies that
could reduce the market value of debt relative to its face value.
13Suppose that pdfc(r) matches pdf(r) in all respects, except that the
mean of pdfc(r) is less than R, the mean of pdf(r), for all A.13 From (9),
the rate of interest that equates r= with p is greater for pdfc(r) than for
pdf(r). Denoting this difference by 6,14 for shareholders the interest rate
on debt need be only i-6 to equate its expected rate of its expected rate of
return with p:
(15)
={ j~ (i-~o) i pdf(r) dr + f
(I-~) i-m -lOO%
(r+9) pdf(r) dr }-
{ f    (i-~)6 pdf(r) dr +-[    (r+~-(l-~)i) pdf(r) dr }
(1-m) (i-6)-m                                                                        (1-m) (i-6)-m
Substituting (15) into (14)
131f pdf and pdf~ did not have the same variance or covariance with
market returns, then they might entail different discount rates for the debt.
141f, for given A, creditors’ expected rate of return on assets equals
p, then i increases without limit as ~ approaches zero, provided Pdfc(r)
places no upper bound on r: when ~ is zero, the expected return on debt
would be less than p for any finite value of i, because removing any portion
of the upper tail of pdfc yields a distribution whose mean is less than the
expected return on asset~. If the expected return on assets exceeds p, then
i is bounded as ~ approaches zero: the maximal value for i solves (9) wh4n
~ equals zero. Therefore, if creditors expect the return on assets to equal
p, while shareholders believe R exceeds ~, then ~ increases Without limit
as ~ approaches zero. If both creditors and shareholders expect the project
to earn rents, then 6 is bounded as ~ approaches zero.
14(16)
(1-~) i-9
(I+R)/ (l+p)-{(l-~o)6    / pdf(r) dr+ _[ q=
=(I+R)/ (l+p) - ~.(~o,A) .
(r+~o-(l-~)i) pdf(r) dr} / (!+p)
~ equals the expected value of returns forgone by sharholders due to the
additional compensation, (i-~)6, required by less optimistic creditors.
Leveraqe~ Heteroqeneous Expectations~ Asymmetric Taxation~ and q
The net return on assets tends to rise with leverage when the corporate
income tax rate on the returns to creditors is less than that on the returns
to equity.15 Suppose the~tax rate on earnings distributed as interest is
zero and that on the return to equity is ¯ when this return is positive.16
Accordingly, (16) becomes
(17) q = (I+R)/(I+@) - ~£((p,A) - r j~ (r -
(i-~) i
(i-~)i) pdf(r) dr / (l+p)
: (I+R) / (l+p) - (~,A) - ¯ ~ (~o,A) .
ISAlthough this section assumes that returns are not correlated with
those of the market portfolio and that the cost of capital increases with
leverage for other reasons, a lower effective tax rate on returns also tends
to increase the variance of these returns and, perhaps, the covariance between
these returns and those on the market portfolio.
~6The project is organized as a C corporation rather than an S
corporation, for example.
15p equals the expected value of shareholders’ returns subject to taxation,
which decreases either as leverage increases or as A rises, thereby depressing
the return on assets.
q initially may increase with leverage when a project is financed
almost entirely by equity, because after-tax returns increase with this change
in leverage. However, q eventually falls with increasing leverage as
creditors, who are less optimistic than shareholders, require substantial
additional compensation for bearing the risk of financing the project.
The Optimal Stock of Assets and the Optimal Capital Structure
When q depends on the enterprise’s capital structure as well as its
stock of assets, selecting the optimal A and ~ may be separated into two
steps. First, for any value of ~, shareholders maximize their wealth by
choosing A so that marginal q equals unity, thereby defining the optimal A as
a function of ~,A°(~) (Figure 3).17 Second, q is maximized with respect to
~, subject to the constraint that A equals A°(~):~ maximizes q(~,A°) at
the point where the graph of A° is tangent to a contour of q(~,A).18
17Because A°is not horizontal, the optimal value of A varles with ~ (see
the Appendi.x).
IBThese stepF imply that q may be written as a function of ~ alone, but
q cannot be expressed as a function of A alone. This ranking of decisions
cannot be reversed by first choosing ~ to maximize q given A, then choosing A
so that u equals unity (see the Appendix). Because the ranking of decisions
cannot be reversed, no alternative definition of marginal equity values might
take into account the change in leverage by defining u=1 along a path passing
through points I and 2 in Figure 4.
16Figure 3
A





Proposition 3: If the MEC is declining, shareholders maximize their
aggregate wealth, the return on the project’s assets is
uncorrelated with market returns (or investors are
risk-neutral), and q is a function of A and e as described
in (.~7), then:
(a) the marginal value of q equals unity at the optimal
stock of assets, but the return on marginal assets and
the marginal cost of capital exceed the cost of
capital;19
(b) the value of A that equates marginal q with unity
varies with e;
19This conclusion is reinforced when the project’s returns are positively
correlated with market returns and p increases with A (see the discussion
following Proposition I). This conclusion may be contradicted when the
project’s returns are negatively correlated with market returns.
17(c) although a shift of the MEC may reduce (increase)
margin~l q, A may rise (fall), provided the shape of
the MEC changes sufficiently as it shifts;
(d) given A, the optimal choice of ~ ordinarily does not
minimize the cost of capital.
Given ~, applying (4) to (17) defines marginal q,2O
(18) 0 = (I+R+AR/)/(l+p)    ~(F + A!]~) - (l + A!)AI).
For fixed ~, the optimal capital stock equates u with unity, according to
logic similar to that of Proposition I. Therefore, from (18), the function
A°(~) is implicitly defined by
(zg) p = m~z- { ~(~ +AD~) + (l +AD~Z)} (1+p).
The marginal return on assets exceeds the cost of capital for the optimal
choice of A, because the two terms inside the braces are positive.21 From
(19), the marginal cost of capital is
p + {~(~ + AD~) + (~ + AD~)} (!+p).
Because ~ and I are different functions of ~, the slope of A° can be
positive or negative, but it is not zero over any interval of ~ (see the
Appendix). When ~ is near unity, for examBle, an increase in @ may increase
Z°Because the project’s returns are not correlated with market returns in
this example, the cost of capital does not depend on A.
ZIThat p is less thah TR/ when corporate income is taxed is a familiar
result. For fixed ~, ~(@,A=) may be represented as:
".     ~ m dA/A~ ,
an average of "marginal ~." D~fferentiating this expnession for ~ with
respect to A~ reveals that m equals ~ + ADAm. By definition, for fixed ~,
neither b nor ADA~ increase as A incneases; consequently, ~f m were negative
for A~, then m would be negative for a]]A greater than Ax, and for some A
greater than Ax,b also would be negative. Because ~ ~s positive for a]] A,
m also must be positive fort all A. A similar logic applies to I.
18~ (returns subject to taxation) more than it diminishes ~ (the additional
interest that shareholders must pay to creditors). In this case, the slope of
is negative: as ~ increases, Ao falls, thereby increasing the marginal rate
~of return on assets (TR/) in order to satisfy (19).
of ~ nearer zero the slope of A° may be positive:
Conversely, for values
an increase in ~ may
increase the tax burden less than it diminishes the rate of interest on debt.
When the enterprise earns economic rents (q exceeds unity for some
choice of A and ~),D~q ordinarily is not zero a~ the optimal choice of @
and A (see the Appendix). Therefore, conditional on A, the choice of ~ does
not necessarily minimize the effective cost of capital (that is, maximize q in
(17)): on the margin, the increase in shareholders’ tax burden (~D~) does
.not equal the reduction in compensation required by creditors I-D~%) when
equity financing increases. A marginal adjustment of leverage from its
optimal value may diminish the cost of capital (increase q, given A), but in
doing so shareholders would reduce their wealth.22
The demand for capital depends on the shape of the MEC. In Figure 4, a
shift of the MEC displaces the graph of Ao downward at point I. But the
optimal value of A does not fall, because the slopes of Ao and the contours
of q become steeper. From (17) the slope along a contour of q is
2~Suppose, qiven ~, a greater value of ~ raises q (sets z~F - ~
equal to zero). Then marginal q would increase with ~ (moving to the right
from optimum shown in Figure 3), and A must also increase to equate marginal q
with unity (to return to the graph of Ao once again). But these new values
of (~,~) do not produce as much wealth for stockholders as the point where
the graph of Ao is tangent to a contour of q.
19(2O)
(TR! - R) / (A(I+p) ) - DA {~ + ~}
and from (19) the slope of A° is
(21)
As the MEC becomes less concave, both (TR/ - R) and TR# become less
negative. If, as shown in the figure (and as illustrated by the example in
the next section), the slopes of A° and the contour of q are positive at
points I and 2 because the numerators and denominators of (20) and (21) are
negative, then the slopes of A° and the contours of q will tend to increase
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2OIII. Heterogeneous Expectations and the Supply of Equity Financing
This section comprises two numerical examples. According to Proposition
3, marginal q and the demand for capital goods can change in Opposite
directions. This section’s first example illustrates this possibil]ty. The
discussion in the previous sections of this paper assumes that shareholders’
endowments do not constrain their equity investments. Should shareholders’
potential contributions of equity be constrained, then the demand for capital
goods can only increase (decrease) when marginal q rises above (falls below)
unity. Nevertheless, in this case as in Propositions 1(b) and 3, the change
in marginal q does not determine the magnitude of the change in the demand for
capital goods. This section’s second example illustrates this conclusion.
The Supply of Equity Financinq Is Not Constrained
For shareholders, the initial distribution of the project’s rate of
return on assets, pdf(r), is rectangular: the range of the distribution is
200 percentage points, and the mean equals
(22) R(A) = 4 - 7~I0-13~A4.
For creditors, the distribution pdfc(r) is the same as that for shareholders
except that its mean is lower
(23) Re(A) = R(A) - ,9~(R(A) -p) ,
The remaining parameters of (9), (17), and (19) are
(9.4) P : i°e = Pc = . 05
Under the conditions stated in Proposition 3, the optimal choice of
(~,A) for the functions specified above is,point 1 in Figure 4 and in
21Table I. The marginal return on assets and the marginal cost of capital are
more than three times greater than the investors’ discount rate (5 percent) or
the interest rate on debt, because the marginal rate of change of interest
expense is relatively great (see (19~). For this reason, the rate of interest
on debt, after corporate taxes, is less than the discount rate.
Suppose investors revise their perceptions of the project’s returns so
that the MEC becomes less concave and marginal q at point I is lower. For
shareholders, the new pdf(r) is identical to the first except that the mean
return becomes
(25) R(A) = ,5 - 9.157~I0-2~AI,
Similarly, the new pdfc(r) is identical to the first, except that its mean is
defined by (23) and (25).
With this revised MEC, q falls substantially at point I, and marginal q
is less than unity. Although the marginal return on assets increases, the
marginal cost of funds exceeds the marginal return on assets. Despite
these consequences, the new optimal choice of (~,A) is point 2 in Figure 4
and in Table I, at which the demand for assets is greater than it is at point
I. The marginal return on assets and the marginal cost of capital also are
greater at point 2 than at point i.
22Table 1
The Demand for Capital and the Optimal Choice of Financial Structur~e
Initial MEC
Evaluated at
Point I Point 1
Stock of Assets (~I) $1019.8 $1019.8










Average (~) 2.48 1.00




on Assets ( 21.4
In Percent .........
30.0 29.1 32.6
Marginal Cost of Capital
less Discount Rate (p)
21.4 32.2 39.1 31.1
16.4 27.2 24.1 26.1
Interest Rate on Debt
Before Taxes (i)
After Taxes ((1-~)1)
6.3 18.2 5.9 6.1
3.2 9.1 3.0 3.1
Interest Premium Paid
by Shareholders (~) .6 10.8 .9 1.1
z)~cy 2.2 3.4 .9 1.1
/~ 8.6 15.7 3.7 4.1
/~I~ -6.3 -12. I -2.7 -2.9
The Initial MEC case is described in (22), (23), and (24). The Revised MEC
case is described in (23), (24),° and (25). The column headings refer to
points in Figures 4 and 5. For columns I and 3, the discussion before
Proposition 3 describes the optimal strategy; for column 4, the discussion
before (26) describes the optimal strategy, given that equity financing cannot
exceed $510. The marginal cost of capital (discussed after (19)) equals TR/
when marginal q equals unity; otherwise, it equals
p + (~(~ +AD~) + (~ + A~))(Z+p).The expected rents on inframarginal assets (at point I) fall with the -
revision of the MEC, an~ creditors (who are not as optimistic as shareholders
under any circumstances) require greater rates of interest on loans to prevent
their expected rate of return from falling. With the revised MEC, interest
expense also rises at a greater rate as assets increase than under the initial
MEC. Consequently, both leverage and t~e interest rate on debt are lower at
point 2 (column 3) than they are at point 1 (column I). Because the terms of
credit have deteriorated (column I versus column 2), shareholders reduce their
leverage in order to reduce the cost of debt financing.
Despite the lower rate of interest at point 2, the hurdle rate required
of investments (the marginal return) increases, because the marginal cost of
capital increases. With the decline in expected rents, (~ + ADA~) in (19)
increases. Because both the optimal hurdle rate of return and the difference
between this return and debt yields may change when the MEC shifts, debt
yields may be a poor proxy for the cost of capital or hurdJe rate of return
that determine the demand for capital assets.
Given A, the choice of ~ does not minimize the cost of capital
(maximize q) for either point I or point 2. In both cases, a small reduction
in leverage would reduce interest expenses (due to the premium paid to
creditors) more than it would reduce the value of the tax shelter (due to the
tax treatment of debt financing). Nevertheless, points i and 2 are optimal:
instead of choosing ~ to minimize the cost of capital, shareholders choose ~
and A jointl~ to maximize their wealth.
The Supply of Equity Financinq Is Co~strained
If shareholders possess only $510, so that their equity investment
absorbs all their funds at point I, then they are unable to provide $1,268 of
24equity in order to reach point 2 after the revision of the MEC (Figure 5).23
Their best strategy, under these circumstances, selects the ~ that maximizes
the value of their $510 equity investment. Taking into account the equity
~¢onstraint, the function AI(~) shows the enterprise’s maximum stock of
assets for each value of ~. Shareholders select the point on AZ(~) that
maximizes:












Contour of q 11
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
See Figure 4 arid Table 1
231n the spirit of Modigliani-Miller, if shareholders,write personal
loans to obtain the required funds, their leverage is no less than it would be
if they had purchased $1,474 .of assets with only $510 of equity. In fact, the
terms on personal loans, including.the loss of limited liability, make this
source of financing less attractive than leveraging the project.
25When equity constraints are binding, the optimal choice of A (point 3)
lies on the section of AI beneath its intersection with A~ ; above this
intersection,, marginal q is less than unity. Consequently, any shift of the
MEC that reduces marginal q below unity (at the former value of A) must also
reduce the demand for assets. If the value of marginal q were greater than
unity initia-lly, then a shift of the MEC that reduces marginal q, but leaves
it above unity at the former value of A, may not reduce the demand for assets.
The optimal stock of assets declines approximately 40 percent (from
point i to point 3) after the shift of the MEC if the supply of equity
financing is limited to $510 (Table I). Marginal q exceeds unity at the
optimal choice of A, and the marginal return on assets exceeds the marginal
cost of capital.
IV. Conclusion
When enterprises earn economic rents that vary with Sheir stocks of
assets, their demand for capital depends on the slope of their MEC schedules
as well as marginal measures of their return on assets, their cost of capital,
or Tobin’s q. Even though a shift of the MEC may increase marginal q or
marginal returns relative to the marginal cost of capital, the demand for
capital tends to be smaller as the average return on assets rises relative to
the returns on marginal assets. Accordingly, as expectations of economic
rents shift, the correspondence between the demand for capital and its
traditional"determinants may cha~ge.
According to Propositions 1 and 3, not all models of investment are
equally robust. In many circumstances, descriptions of the demand for capital
that assume the marginal rate of return on assets equals either the (user)
26cost of capital or the weighted cost of funds are less stable than ~odels that
assume marginal q equals unity. Models assuming that investment spending or
changes in the demand for capital correspond to changes in marginal q at any
~~iven stock of capital also may be relatively unstable.24
Horse races among models of investment using ex post data typically find
that the accelerator model finishes in the money, while the performance of
other models generally is less consistent (Berndt 1991). Even though the
demand for capital may not be stably related to many of its traditional
determinants when the pattern of economic rents shifts, the ex post rate of
output may be a reliable indicator of an enterprise’s scale of operation and
its demand for capital, provided the ratio of capital to other factors of
production is sufficiently stable. Consequently, the accelerator model might
be expected to carry less of a handicap when the course of output is known or
Can be predicted with sufficient accuracy.
When shareholders’ expectations of an enterprise’s economic rents exceed
the expectations of others, the value of the enterprise depends on its capital
structure as well as its stock of capi-tal. This discrepancy between the
assessments of shareholders and creditors also may create the appearance of a
"pecking order" in the enterprise’s sources of funds. When business
conditions are promising, entrepreneurs expect relatively great returns~ and
if creditors tend to concur, the optimum degree of leverage is relatively
great. Accordingly, an expanding capital stock absorbs both internal funds
24This conclusion is strengthened when marginal q (using the value of the
firm’s marketable secur~tiesi is not necessarily equal to unity at the optimal
stock of assets. The value of implicit options, such as waiting to invest,
must be taken into account fo~ a more comprehensive concept of q. See Myers
(1977), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988), and Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1989).
27and a relatively large amount of debt financing. When conditions are less
promising, the difference between shareholders’ and creditors’ expectations
may be gr~at; consequently, the optimal degree of leverage falls. With the
diminished demand for capital, the volume of new debt financing falls more
than the retention of earnings. On the margin, changes in the demand for
capital correspond comparatively closely with changes in the volume of debt
financing, suggesting that enterprises rely first on internal sources and then
on external sources to fund their capital budgets.
Behind this apparent pecking order is an optimal capital structure.
When an enterprise’s cash flow is sufficiently great compared to its rate of
investment in assets, the substitution of credit for internal funds prevents
leverage from falling to zero. Accordingly, relatively mature enterprises
distribute dividends to shareholders even as they increase their obligations
to creditors. When cash flow is not so great compared to the demand for new
assets, the enterprise reinvests all of its internal funds to prevent leverage
from rising to unity. Consequently, enterprises that are growing relatively
rapidly retain all earnings. If the demand for assets is very great compared
to cash flow, the enterprise must issue.new equity to achieve its optimal
capital structure.
When the discrepancy between the expectations of shareholders and
creditors increases greatly, creditors are unwilling to maintain the previous
degree of debt financing at interest rates that entrepreneurs consider
reasonable. To the degree that enterprises offer creditors more acCeptable
coverage ratios by cleaning up their balance sheets and by curtailing their
capital budgets, the change in interest rates on debt may understate the
change in creditors’ discount rates as perceived by shareholders. In these
28cases, the resulting reduction in the volume of debt financing or of
investment may seem to be especially great compared to the rise in interest
rates, and enterprises that are highly levered given creditors’ expectations
of rents may be "shut out" of credit markets at reasonable rates of interest,
giving the appearance of a rationing Of credit.
A change in conditions that increases marginal q may diminish the demand
for capital any time the value of enterprises earning economic rents depends
on the choice of variables other than the stock of capital--variables such as
the capital-labor ratio, the choice of technology,~ the pricing of products, or
the mix of outputs. For example, when q varies with the employment of labor
services, the stock of assets for which marginal q equals unity also varies
with labor services (see the Appendix). A lower tax on the income of laborers
may diminish the wage rate, thereby increasing rents, other things equal. But
the demand for capital may increase comparatively little or even subside if
the lower relative wage rate induces management to substitute labor for
capital to a great degree.
29Appendix
Given ’that q(~,A) exceeds unity for some feasible choice of (~,A)
and that q is a continuous function, the region over which q(~,A) exceeds
unity, A exceeds A*, and ~ is positive but less than unity is an open set.
Within this set, the function A° assigns to each value of ~ that value of A
for which marginal q equals unity. The projection of this region onto the ~
axis is the relevant domain for A°. The only points where A° may intersect
the contour q=l are those where both u and q equal unity, implying that D~q
is zero (see (4)) and that the tangent to the contour is of q perpendicular
to the 9 axis at these points.
A°(~)is not parallel to the 9 axis (horizontal) over any open
interval for 9 unless the corporate tax rate is zero and creditors’
assessment of the return on assets matches that of stockhelders. From the
total differential of (4), assuming u is constant at unity,
(AI) DmA° = - (A D,D~q + Dmq) / (2DAq + AD]q) .
The denominator of (AI) is negative. If the numerator equals zero, then (from
the continuity of q)
(A2) A DA (Dmq) = - (Dmq) .
Satisfying equation (A2) over an open interval of ~ requires that q be
independent:of ~ -- r and 6 equal zero.
Although A° is not horizontal over an open interval in the domain of ~
under the conditions of this paper, D~A° may be zero at one or possibly more
points. The optimum choice of ~ may correspond to one of these points only
3Ounder special circumstances. If A° is tangent to a contour of q at a point
where both are horizontal to the ~ axis:
Consequently, rDe~ and Dml must be equal in magnitude but of opposite
signs, (A3)~ furthermore, these slopes must change at the same rate (in
opposite directions) when A changes, (A4). These two conditions generally
will not be satisfied at the same point for independent specifications of the
functions pdf(r) and pdfc(r), as is illustrated by the example in section III
of the paper.
Because A° is not necessarily horizontal at the optimal choice of ~:
qiven~, D~q does not necessarily equal zero, and the marginal tax saving
associated with a small alteration of leverage does not equal the marginal
change in the cost of debt financing.
Because A° and the contour of q to which it is tangent are not
necessarily horizontal at the optimal choice of (~,A), the optimal choice of
(@,A) ordinarily is not attained by: first, maximizing q with respect to ~
given A, thereby defining ~°(A); second, choosing the pair(s) for which
u(~°,A) equals unity. With this approach, ~o intersects the contours Of q
only where their tangents are parallel to the ~ axis. Therefore, this
alternative cannot yield the optimal choice of (~,A), unless, perhaps, A°
is horizontal at the optimal choice of ~.
Instead of dwelling solely on leverage, q may depend on the enterprise’s
choice of labor as well as capital. Suppose
31(A5) q(L,A) = (I+R(L,A) ) / (l+p), where
(A6) R(L,A) = (p(Q(L,A) ) Q(L,A) -w(L) A) / Ao
If the functions p (the price of output, from a downward-sloping demand
curve), Q (the quantity of output, from a neoclassical production function),
and w (the wage rate, from an upward-sloping supply schedule) have the usual
properties and if q exceeds unity for some choice of (L,A), then the region
over which q exceeds unity is an open set. If the optimal choice of A, given
L, equates marginal q with unity, then the function A°(L), the analysis of
the choice of the optimal (L,A), and the correspondence between changes in
marginal q and the demand for capital are analogous to those for
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